 Juliette Bourahla

The Paradox of Tunisia's Arab Spring

Assessing the legacy of the Jasmine Revolution

About the Article

Main Question: What is the legacy and lasting consequences of the Jasmine Revolution? **Argument:** Democratization was undermined by socioeconomic decline and weak institutions, enabling an authoritarian setback. **Conclusion:** Sustainable governance relies on positive socioeconomic outcomes and accountability, not just constitutional design.

About the Author

Juliette Bourahla recently graduated from Maastricht University and is a Masters student in International Development and Public Policy at Nova SBE Portugal. Her academic and professional interests include humanitarian work, development and human rights especially in the MENA region and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Her professional project is to work as researcher and consultant in policy and development for international organizations.

Introduction

The

Arab Spring is often recognized as one of the most important movements of political upheaval in the MENA region. Among the countries affected, Tunisia has a unique place. Tunisia is regarded as the country that gave birth to the Arab Spring and as the only democracy that emerged from it (Masri, 2017). Tunisia's Arab Spring, coined Jasmine Revolution, began in December 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a produce vendor from Sidi Bouzid, died by self-immolation in protest. This Jasmine Revolution quickly led to the collapse of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali's authoritarian regime in January 2011 and paved the way for the democratic transition that would later be described as the most successful aftermath of the Arab Spring. Yet, more than a decade later, Tunisia still struggles with similar political and socio-economic challenges that tarnish the long-term impact of Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution. This report seeks to examine the legacy and lasting consequences of the Tunisian Arab Spring along 3 dimensions: the evolution of the Tunisian legal and political system, how the Jasmine Revolution impacted the socio-economic sphere, and the role played by international and regional human rights bodies in Tunisia's uprising and democratic transition.

Current Legal and Political System

Tunisia emerged from the Arab Spring as one of

the most successful countries in terms of democratic progress, establishing a new constitution and free and fair elections. Yet, since 2021, this progress is tainted by the actions of President Kais Saied that centralizes power, and provokes a democratic setback, justified by the claim Tunisia needs to be stabilized post-Covid-19 pandemic and mass protests. An accurate way to present Tunisia today is as a presidential republic that has weakened checks and balances for the parliamentary and judiciary.

The 2014 Constitutional Framework

After years of deliberations and political crises following the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia's constitution was adopted in January 2014 (Zimbris, 2017). Its aim was to set the foundation for a democratic regime with a new balance of powers and an independent judiciary, as demanded by the population. Article 2 of this constitution establishes Tunisia as a "civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people" rather than a military or religious state controlled by religious institutions (Zimbris, 2017). Islam remains the national religion. This compromise was crucial to reduce divergence between secularists and members of Ennahda, the Islamic party. The power division seeks to prevent the return of authoritarianism. For example, by stating that "the Constitution may not be amended to increase the number or the length of presidential terms", it avoids history to repeat itself when former president Ben Ali modified the constitution to be re-elected.

**National Dialogue Quartet:
A civil society coalition that
emerged in 2014 as a
mediator to stabilize Tunisia
and facilitate compromise
between opposed parties.**

The Constitution establishes a semi-presidential system where the President is mostly responsible for defense and foreign affairs while the Prime Minister is the Head of Government and defines the general domestic policy and its implementation. The President is directly elected by citizens and the PM is chosen by the majority party. The legislative branch is ruled by the Assembly of the People's Representatives, elected by the citizens. It ensures government accountability and emphasizes the role of the opposition in the Assembly as counterpower. Overall, this division of power acts as an essential safeguard to democracy. The Constitution also grants institutional rights and freedoms to the people: freedom of expression, association, political participation for all citizens, men and women. Such rights are essential as they create a legal basis for pluralism, civil society and equality.

Judicial Independence: Tension between intents and implementation

Judicial independence was a central demand of the revolution the new Constitution had to satisfy by freeing the judiciary from executive control, to ensure the rule of law and checks and balances on the executive. Articles 102 and 109 recognize judiciary independence and prohibits interference with its functioning (Zimbris, 2017). The Constitution creates a Supreme Judicial Council as an oversight body. However, there were several amendments to this Council until April 2016 amid concerns that the judiciary

independence from the executive. More generally, Tunisia's efforts to strengthen the rule of law were weakened by delays in operationalizing key accountability mechanisms like the Constitutional Court, designed to arbitrate disputes and limit power abuses. Without strong constitutional review, there is room for executive power abuses, bypassing accountability and creating important institutional vulnerability. For democracy to be lasting and resilient, there must be judicial independence and efficiency. In Tunisia, this can be disputed.

The 2014-2019 Consensus Politics Era

The democratic system created by the 2014 Constitution to prevent authoritarianism began to lose legitimacy with a period of consensus politics. After 2014, politics relied mostly on

coalition-building between usually rival blocs. The religious party Ennahda and secular parties like Nidaa Tounes cooperated to avoid polarization and segmentation and civil conflict. Such consensus allowed stability as it enabled constitutional order, electoral legitimacy and key political institutions could smoothly operate. Yet, over time, these consensus politics produced weak governments due to frequent cabinet changes and unstable majorities in the Parliament. Reform paralysis was observed with inability to address issues such as unemployment, regional inequality or corruption. Consensus, rather than being democratic accountability, became perceived as elite bargaining. The population began to have distrust in Parliament,

Tunisia's socioeconomic trajectory post-2011 exhibits a paradox between democratization and socioeconomic outcomes.

seeing parties are ineffective and self-interested. There were increasing protests due to this legitimacy crisis of the political bodies and the new democratic system. This frustration and inefficiency is what opened the way for Kais Saied, elected President during the 2019 elections. While consensus politics prevented polarization and segmentation at first, it contributed to a governance paralysis and decreasing trust in Parliament and parties.

The 2021-2022 Pivot and Electoral Reform

In 2019, Tunisia would have been characterized as an imperfect democracy. With Saied's election in 2019 and the general context, this system slowly shifted towards a centralized presidential system. Between 2019 and 2021 roughly, a multifaceted crisis peaked in Tunisia: mass protests called for political reforms due to the Parliament delegitimization accused of corruption and inefficiency, and the economic and healthcare consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Party fragmentation further reinforced this sentiment. To maintain control over the situation, in July 2021, President Saied invoked Article 80 of the Constitution that enables exceptional measures in the case of imminent danger that threatens the nation (Ali, 2022). These measures included the suspension of the Assembly and dismissal of PM Mechichi, political rival of Saied and supported by Ennahda. From then, Saied governed mostly through decrees (Branislav, 2020). While such measures are officially portrayed as ways to stabilize Tunisia, tackle corruption and dissatisfaction, it is largely described as a self-coup, reversing key elements of the democratic progress post-Arab Spring (Branislav, 2020; Ali, 2022). This

undemocratic takeover was possible in part due to the absence of an operational Constitutional Court that couldn't limit power abuses and to generally weak oversight and democratic checks mechanisms. A constitutional referendum in July 2022 formally established a bicameral Parliament and shifted from a semi-presidential system to a presidential system. This reformed power division strengthened the President and the executive branch overall, reducing government accountability and pluralism. This centralization project was furthered by electoral reforms that limit access to elections due to increased administrative and financial barriers. The main reform entailed a shift from party-based proportional representation to single-member districts, reducing party influence in favour of individuals (Ali, 2022). Electoral reforms acted as a further support in this manoeuvre away from democratic progress that emerged post-Jasmine Revolution led by President Kais Saied.

Analytical Conclusion

From the end of the Arab Spring until now, Tunisia became a democracy centered around a balanced power division and then shifted towards a presidential republic with a concentration of power in the executive branch. Some elements of the new system weakened over time: judicial independence and constitutional oversight, party competition and institutional independence. This development has crucial implications for Tunisia as this democratic backsliding could accentuate, limiting pluralism, weakening the rule of law and increasing instability. Tunisia's experience post-Jasmine Revolutions shows that constitutional design alone cannot ensure democratic progress if institutional checks and balances remain weakly implemented

socioeconomic challenges persist.

Socioeconomic impacts of the Arab Spring

While Tunisia achieved remarkable democratization post-2011, this success did not translate into socioeconomic stability, generating general discontent that opened the way for the 2021 political setback.

Macroeconomic Decline

Tunisia's post-revolution development is characterized by an overall negative economic trajectory that contrasts with Tunisia's status before 2011 as a competitive actor and model in the African region, highly ranked by the World Economic Forum, and supported by the IMF and WB (Becheikh, 2021). GDP and GDP per capita kept declining over the decade and only expanded in the beginning of 2025 when it increased by 2.4 percent, growth thus remained weak and unstable (World Bank, 2025). Drivers of this decline are often attributed to the repeated instability post-2011 with numerous political assassinations, terrorist attacks or strikes. This affects investor trust, demand for tourism as well as government capacity to reform the state. Indeed, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decreased from \$1.33bn in 2010 to \$0.62 in 2016. Also, unemployment rose from 13% in 2010 to over 18% in 2011, standing at around 15% today (Becheikh, 2021; World Bank, 2025). Hence, the Arab Spring relatively succeeded politically but also generated macroeconomic instability that deceived public expectations of social justice post-revolution.

Sectoral Impacts

This macroeconomic decline had concrete impacts on specific sectors of the economy, further worsening Tunisia's situation post-2011. Tourism was an essential component of the Tunisian economy creating countless jobs, source of foreign currency and generating large revenues. Due to the marked instability post-revolution and terrorist attacks, Tunisian tourism slowed down with International Tourism Receipts (ITR) falling from \$3.5bn to \$1.7bn between 2010 and 2016 (Chebbi 2020; Becheikh, 2021). Yet, in the past years, tourism activity has partly recovered, with estimated 2025 ITR at \$2.8bn (Office National du Tourisme Tunisien, 2026). Instability impedes on having a welcoming business climate, explaining the decline in FDI post-2011. Yet, while perceived instability has largely decreased in the recent years, FDI has not recovered and stagnates below the FDI levels pre-Arab Spring. The phosphates sector is evidence of the crisis of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) marked by dysfunction and inefficiency. Phosphate production was a strategic export for Tunisia and an important source of state revenue. In 2011, the production fell by 5.5 million tons and has not recovered since. Large strikes and protests affected this production. This production decline had important economic consequences as it reduced export earnings for the state and led to increased pressure on the state, impacting Tunisia's ability to deliver on the socioeconomic expectations of the revolution.

Public Finance and Debt

After the Jasmine Revolution, the government had to deliver on the claims of the people for more jobs, better wages and redistribution of wealth. Thus, the state largely expanded employment in

the public sector, with around 95,000 hires between 2011 and 2012, alongside wages and spending increases (Becheikh, 2021). However, concerns arose regarding “ghost jobs” and recruitment being non-competitive and thus inefficient. The issue is that while this reduced the social tension for a moment, it led to a large fiscal imbalance for the state. This led to increased international borrowing, higher public debt, the Tunisian currency, the dinar, depreciated, inflation and thus worse living standards. Finances were further constrained by increased spending on security and counterterrorism. This large increase in public spending to try to answer the demand of the people created a debt trap for Tunisia.

Inequality and Human Capital Losses

Before the Arab Spring, Tunisia’s socioeconomic success was actually hiding large regional disparities between the North and the South and poverty underestimated by official statistics. On top of that, since 2011, Tunisia’s inequality and Gini coefficient have increased from 35.8 (2010) to 40 (2020) (World Bank, 2025). While the budget was increased and measures were taken for the development of poorer regions, inequality still persisted. Most reforms failed due to bureaucratic formalities, corruption or reform paralysis impeding on government and spending efficiency. Simultaneously, Tunisia experienced an increasing flight of skilled labor, weakening long-term development goals. The brain drain phenomenon has strongly accelerated in the years post-2011, with an estimated 10,000 engineers fleeing Tunisia between 2017 and 2019 and many more workers from the medical sector emigrating as well (Becheikh, 2021). This

loss in human capital reduces the capacity of Tunisia to rely on its highly-skilled citizens to contribute to Tunisia’s modernization and socioeconomic development.

Analytical Conclusion

Overall, Tunisia’s socioeconomic trajectory post-2011 exhibits a paradox between democratization and socioeconomic outcomes. While the democratic progress increased rights and liberties, the issues of persistent unemployment, inequality and brain drain contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the government that fed disillusionment regarding the post-Arab Spring promises.

Role of International and Regional Human Rights Bodies

In Tunisia’s Arab Spring and during the aftermath, international actors mattered but they were however not decisive. Before 2011, there was relative neglect of Tunisia as it was considered a stable partner, seemingly not requiring attention. Yet, after the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia became the topic of attention for democracy promotion and human rights, gathering strong support from NGOs and institutions. The impact of this support remained limited due to weak implementation and accountability. Overall, the most efficient mechanism for Tunisia was civil society mediation by domestic actors, especially by the National Dialogue Quartet, awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for its work.

Pre-2011 Strategic Neglect

Prior to 2011, Tunisia was under Ben Ali’s

authoritarian regime, which included violations of human rights such as censorship, torture, imprisonment. Yet, it was either neglected or tolerated by external, Western actors who prioritized the country's stability, cooperation and economic partnerships. NGOs such as Amnesty or Human Rights Watch did document repression in Tunisia. However their influence was limited because of Ben Ali's control and the political priorities of its international allies. This suggests that international human rights promotion would be shaped by geopolitics rather than only by norms. Behind this is also a logic of resource allocation, NGO attention and resources can be directed according to political opportunity and donor priorities due to NGOs' limited resources to cover human rights developments everywhere (Steinberg, 2012).

Post-revolution International Institutional Support

After the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia became a "success story" of the Arab Spring due to its apparent positive outcomes. Thus, it attracted increased engagement, funding and assistance as it was now framed as democratic transition needing support. The UN OHCHR sent a team of experts to report on areas requiring the attention of international actors and set up an office in Tunisia to support its transition (UN News, 2011). The UN provided election training, technical assistance and reform support to ensure human rights are at the heart of the country's democratic transition. Especially, the UN office established aimed to address the root causes of human rights violations (Turan, 2018). In the MENA and African region, Tunisia's was one of the most assisted democratic transitions due to its openness and consensus-based transition (Turan,

2018).

Transitional Justice and Accountability Gap

In 2011, many Tunisians required transitional justice with a punishment of torture, dismantlement of corruption networks and general justice for the victims of the revolution of Ben Ali's authoritarian regime. International human rights bodies like the UN, Amnesty or HRW, supported this and motivated reforms through advocacy and monitoring. For example, Amnesty and HRW called for accountability and to avoid impunity (Aliriza, 2020). However, real accountability remained limited due to weak or slow legal institutions, the politicization of transitional justice, the preference for compromise and an overall lack of governmental capacity and stability. This is an accountability gap because there was documentation of human rights violations, with the help of NGOs. Yet, the prosecutions were either slow or incomplete. Such a gap also contributed to the general citizen disillusionment with democracy, creating welcoming conditions for the 2021 democratic backsliding. Failures in transitional justice weakened the rule of law in Tunisia and undermined trust in Tunisia's democratic transition.

Civil Society as Mediator: The National Dialogue Quartet

A distinctive characteristic of Tunisia's democratic transition is the role of domestic civil society in managing the country's political crisis better than international actors did. This civil society took the form of the National Dialogue Quartet. While it is not a human rights body, it is a coalition of

civil society that acted as mediator and an actor of stabilization focused on rights. The National Dialogue Quarter emerged as a mediator in 2014, formed by four civil society organizations in a context of democratic collapse and political paralysis. It created a roadmap for change, facilitated compromise between opposed parties like Ennahda and thus enabled the completion of the Constitution as well as the formation of a technocratic government. The Quartet was significant for human rights as it demonstrated the capacity of civil society and its commitment to the protection of rights. While the Quartet was leading the process, it was supported by international actors such as NGOs. The importance of the National Dialogue Quartet was internationally recognized with their awarding of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. The Quartet illustrates how Tunisia's democratic transition relied less on external enforcement of human rights than on its domestic civil society actors.

Analytical Conclusion

Overall, the role of international and regional human rights actors in Tunisia shifted after 2011 from limited engagement that prioritized stability to active support of the transition through monitoring and capacity building. International human rights bodies contributed to increasing transparency, strengthening civil society as well as supporting democratic norms and reforming processes. Yet, their role was limited due to their limited influence and resources, the importance of geopolitics and an incomplete transitional justice. Tunisia's case highlights both the benefits and the limits of international human rights governance support. While external actors can support democratic transitions, durable effects on

the protection of rights depend on the domestic political will and cannot be substituted by external intervention.


Conclusion

Throughout this report, it became clear that Tunisia is indeed an Arab Spring "exception" regarding its democratic progress. Yet, the legacy of the Jasmine Revolution today is mixed due to the democratic backsliding, or economic stagnation. The 2014 Constitution established a pluralist, semi-presidential democracy with checks and balances. However, the weak implementation of institutions such as the judiciary made this new system vulnerable. Such vulnerabilities left room for Saied's concentration of power and constitutional change in 2022 that weakened Tunisia's democracy. Tunisia's socioeconomic status post-2011 exhibits a paradox. Regardless of the country's democratization and liberalization, there weren't socioeconomic gains. Tunisia's socioeconomic trajectory is marked by limited growth, unemployment, inequality, fiscal issues and brain drain. Such poor outcomes fueled a legitimacy crisis for the government and disillusionment of the citizens. The role of human rights actors in Tunisia has also experienced a shift before and after 2011. Before the Arab Spring, there was a strategic neglect of Tunisia's human rights violations since it was considered a stable partner. Yet, after the revolution, there was increased international engagement from NGOs and institutions to support the democratic transition. They contributed through monitoring, technical assistance and norm diffusion but lacked enforcement and accountability. A key actor in that regard was the National Dialogue Quartet. Overall, Tunisia's experience exhibits

civil society that acted as mediator and an actor of stabilization focused on rights. The National Dialogue Quarter emerged as a mediator in 2014, formed by four civil society organizations in a context of democratic collapse and political paralysis. It created a roadmap for change, facilitated compromise between opposed parties like Ennahda and thus enabled the completion of the Constitution as well as the formation of a technocratic government. The Quartet was significant for human rights as it demonstrated the capacity of civil society and its commitment to the protection of rights. While the Quartet was leading the process, it was supported by international actors such as NGOs. The importance of the National Dialogue Quartet was internationally recognized with their awarding of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. The Quartet illustrates how Tunisia's democratic transition relied less on external enforcement of human rights than on its domestic civil society actors.

Visuals

A. Timeline




B. Economic trend graphs


GDP growth: (2009-2024)




Unemployment: (2009-2025)



Inflation rate: (2009-2024)



FDI: (2009-2024)



C. Institutional comparison table

	Before 2011: Ben Ali's authoritarian system	The 2014 Constitution: Semi-presidential system	2022 Constitutional change: Presidential system
Executive power	President (Ben Ali)	Shared between President & PM	Strong presidential authority
Judiciary independence	Weak, under influence of the executive	Protected by the Constitution Supreme Judicial Council	Protected by the Constitution but limited oversight
Mechanisms of constitutional review	No effective constitutional court	Delayed creation of a Constitutional Court	New constitutional mechanisms but constrained review
Political parties & pluralism	Dominated by ruling party Controlled competition	Competitive & multi-party system	Electoral reforms that weakened parties
Elections	Controlled elections	Proportional representation	Single-member districts

Analytical Conclusion

Overall, the role of international and regional human rights actors in Tunisia shifted after 2011 from limited engagement that prioritized stability to active support of the transition through monitoring and capacity building. International human rights bodies contributed to increasing transparency, strengthening civil society as well as supporting democratic norms and reforming processes. Yet, their role was limited due to their limited influence and resources, the importance of geopolitics and an incomplete transitional justice. Tunisia's case highlights both the benefits and the limits of international human rights governance support. While external actors can support democratic transitions, durable effects on the protection of rights depend on the domestic political will and cannot be substituted by external intervention.

Conclusion

Throughout this report, it became clear that Tunisia is indeed an Arab Spring "exception" regarding its democratic progress. Yet, the legacy of the Jasmine Revolution today is mixed due to the democratic backsliding, or economic stagnation. The 2014 Constitution established a pluralist, semi-presidential democracy with checks and balances. However, the weak implementation of institutions such as the judiciary made this new system vulnerable. Such vulnerabilities left room for Saied's concentration of power and constitutional change in 2022 that weakened Tunisia's democracy. Tunisia's socioeconomic status post-2011 exhibits a paradox. Regardless of the country's democratization and liberalization, there weren't socioeconomic gains. Tunisia's socioeconomic

trajectory is marked by limited growth, unemployment, inequality, fiscal issues and brain drain. Such poor outcomes fueled a legitimacy crisis for the government and disillusionment of the citizens. The role of human rights actors in Tunisia has also experienced a shift before and after 2011. Before the Arab Spring, there was a strategic neglect of Tunisia's human rights violations since it was considered a stable partner. Yet, after the revolution, there was increased international engagement from NGOs and institutions to support the democratic transition. They contributed through monitoring,

technical assistance and norm diffusion but lacked enforcement and accountability. A key actor in that regard was the National Dialogue Quartet. Overall, Tunisia's experience exhibits how the sustainability of governance post-revolution depends not only on constitutional design alone but also on the capacity to implement accountability and bring about positive socioeconomic outcomes.

References

- African Development Bank Group. (n.d.). *Tunisia: North Africa*. Retrieved April 20, 2026, from: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-africa/tunisia>
- Alexander, C. (2013). *Tunisia: From stability to revolution in the Maghreb*. (ISBN:978-1-138-88613-1 (hbk)). Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group. <https://archive.org/details/tunisiafromstabi0000alex>
- Ali, H. (2022). *Defense against small parties: electoral reforms and their impact on Tunisia's electoral system since the Arab Spring*. *Zeitschrift für vergleichende politikwissenschaft*, 16(3), 483–503. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-023-00561-z>
- Aliriza, F. (2020, October 28). *Eight Years After it Launched the Arab Spring, Tunisia Still Struggles With the Legacy of Dictatorship*. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/14/eight-years-after-it-launched-arab-spring-tunisia-still-struggles-legacy#:~:text=The%20commission%20has:%20*%20Opened%2062%2C720%20files,have%20attempted%20to%20stop%20the%20commission's%20work
- Becheikh, N. (2021) *Political stability and economic growth in developing economies: lessons from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt ten years after the Arab Spring*. *Insights into Regional Development*, 3 (2), pp.229 - 251. <https://hal.science/hal-03583934/>
- Branislav, S. (2020). *Tunisia: Political situation ahead of the constitutional referendum*. Think Tank, European Parliament. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA\(2022\)729346](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2022)729346)
- Chebbi, N. (2020). *An assessment of the benefits and results of the Arab Spring with focus on Tunisia for the period 2011-2020* [MA Thesis, Seoul National University]. <https://space.snu.ac.kr/handle/10371/177415?mode=full>
- World Bank. (2025). *Tunisia Economic Monitor, Fall 2025: Strengthening Social Safety Nets for Increased Efficiency and Equity*. World Bank. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/44080> License: CC BY-NC 3.0 IGO <https://doi.org/10.1596/44080>
- Masri, S. M. (2017). *Tunisia: An Arab anomaly*. Columbia University Press. <https://books.google.pt/books?id=sBgwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT10&dq=Tunisia%20arab%20spring&lr&pg=PT3#v=onepage&q=Tunisia%20arab%20spring&f=false>
- Mcseveney, R. M. (2020, April 1). *Tunisia and the Arab Spring: origins, causes, and consequences*. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/trecms/AD1177794/>

- Office National du Tourisme Tunisien. (2026, January 7). *Tunisia Tourism Revenues Rise 6.5% in 2025*. Office National du Tourisme Tunisien posted on the topic LinkedIn. LinkedIn.
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/office-national-du-tourisme-tunisien_tourism-revenues-on-the-rise-in-tunisia-activity-7414771967733755904-2HT3#:~:text=3mo-,Tourism%20Revenues%20on%20the%20Rise%20in%20Tunisia%20%F0%9F%87%B9%F0%9F%87%B3%20Tunisia's,in%20Tunisia%20as%20a%20destination%20
- Steinberg, G.M. (2012). *International NGOs, the Arab Upheaval, and Human Rights: Examining NGO Resource Allocation*. 11 *Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights*.
<http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol11/iss1/5>
- Turan, T. (2018). *The UN's response to the underlying causes of the Arab Spring before and after the eruption of events: a critical assessment of the UN's pursuit of its core values and purposes*. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 54(4), 683–705.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48543800>
- UN News. (2011, February 24). *Tunisia: UN human rights team lays out path for transition to democracy*. UN News.
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/02/367452#:~:text=The%20Tunisian%20authorities%20have%20asked,children%2C%20youth%20and%20marginalized%20communities>
- Zimbris, A. (2017). *A Guide to the Tunisian Legal System*. Globalex.
<https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/tunisia1.html>