

Carlo Magnani



## The Security Dilemma in post-Arab Spring Libya

The impact of the Arab Spring in Libya: the Security  
Dilemma and the Fragmentation of the State

### About the Article

How did the Arab Spring shape Libya's long-term political fragmentation and insecurity? The 2011 uprising dismantled weak state institutions, triggering a security dilemma where militias and foreign actors filled the power vacuum, reinforcing division. Libya's instability persists due to entrenched militia power and external interference, making unified governance and democratic transition unlikely without structural change.

### About the Author

Young Italian graduate who obtained a Bachelor's degree in International Sciences and European Institutions from the University of Milan. Throughout his studies, he developed a strong academic interest and competence in international relations, with particular attention to international security and defence. He wrote a Bachelor's thesis about the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and he is now enrolled in a bilingual Master's program in International Relations at ULB (Brussels).

**The** Arab Springs were depicted as one of the most relevant mass political upheavals in the 21st century. While beginning in Tunisia with the so-called Jasmine Revolution in late 2010, the popular uprisings spread widely across the Middle East and North Africa, driven by a blend of domestic grievances and transnational influences, usually linked to democratic demands (Ayanda, 2025).

In Libya, what initially began as peaceful demonstrations turned, within a year, into a full-scale revolution and, following the fall of Gaddafi's brutal regime, into a civil war that still prevents the country from achieving stability and unity today. Yet, fifteen years later, Libya has become a fractured and unstable state, lacking both democratic legitimacy and institutional coherence (Saidin & Storm, 2024).

In this regard, the impact of the Arab Spring in Libya remains both current and essential for understanding the country's political, institutional, and social landscape. Despite the multiple factors that contributed to Libya's destabilization the popular uprisings of 2011 represented the spark that triggered the country's long, fragmented, and painful trajectory over the past fifteen years.

This article aims to retrace the effects of the political, geopolitical, and social upheavals that emerged from the Arab Spring in Libya, with a particular focus on how security challenges have hindered the emergence of a unified government grounded in democratic institutions, even after the fall of Gaddafi's regime.

## **Historical and political context in**

## **Libya before the Arab Spring**

The sources of Libya's 2011 revolution, discontent and disaffection roused by political repression and economic inequality, are much like the causes of upheavals elsewhere in the Arab world, but in Libya the groundwork for democracy is much weaker. Indeed, in Libya, corruption, unemployment, and the economic crisis have been more significant drivers of unrest than citizens' demands for democratic reforms. (Boduszynski & Pickard, 2013).

After a successful bloodless coup, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi overthrew King Idris I in 1969, marking the beginning of a personalist dictatorial regime that would last for over forty years. Inspired by Nasser, Gaddafi imposed his own vision of prosperity and success on the Libyan population. He formalized his ideas in *The Green Book* (1975), in which he outlined his Third Universal Theory, a self-styled alternative to both capitalism and communism that combined elements of Islam, socialism, direct democracy, and nationalism (St. John, 2012; Martinez, 2007). Gaddafi criticized Western societies and institutions, promoting a system of direct democracy in which there were no "representatives" of the people, meaning no political parties or parliaments. By the late 1970s, his rule became increasingly autocratic: political dissent was systematically suppressed, and citizens faced arbitrary arrest and trial (Totman & Hardy, 2015).

On the economic front, Gaddafi's zeal in promoting an extensive system of reforms served to give the appearance of real change, while the underlying structures of the state remained largely unchanged. After having thoroughly dismantled

the state's institutions, Gaddafi leveraged the revenues generated by the country's vast oil wealth to build an intricate and complex clientelist system (Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka, 2016). Based on loyalty and the commitment to safeguarding his regime, he redistributed resources, economic benefits, and material goods to factions loyal to his power, a practice facilitated by the numerous tribal and cultural divisions inherent in Libya.

The result was a dysfunctional system founded on reciprocal exchanges of benefits, the co-optation of tribes and communities tied to the dictator through economic gain, and the perpetual instability and dynamism of the political and economic context.

The interplay of these dynamics, strategies, and processes created a self-reinforcing chain of events that ultimately led to the collapse of the regime and to the fragmentation and structural fragility of the Libyan state (Badi, 2021).

In February 2011, thousands of people manifested their demands and malcontent in the streets, demanding genuine reforms that would bring employment, economic growth, political freedoms and security, but they were soon met with military repression. February 17, 2011, known as the "Day of Rage", marked the beginning of the end of Gaddafi's dictatorial regime. After facing resistance from citizens and numerous rebel groups that formed rapidly, Gaddafi's forty-year regime culminated in a brutal civil revolution, a NATO military intervention under a UN mandate, a civil war

and the death of the dictator in 2011.

The removal of Gaddafi left a profound power vacuum: forty years of authoritarian rule had left no institutions on which to rebuild state authority (Totman & Hardy, 2015). While the post-NATO transitional government was collapsing under corruption and militia pressure, in 2014, the situation escalated into a second civil war, splitting the country into two rival governments, a division that persists to this day.

International efforts to end the civil war led to the formation of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli, under al-Serraj in 2015, but the attempt failed, largely

due to the exclusion of key factions, such as armed groups, tribes, and Gaddafi loyalists, whose absence proved fatal given the weakness of Libyan institutions and growing external

interferences.

This fragility was starkly exposed in April 2019, when General Haftar, main representant of the parallel government in Tobruk, launched a military offensive to capture Tripoli, besieging the GNA for over seven months while Western allies largely stood aside. A cessation of hostilities was achieved with the establishment of a second UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2021.

A second UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) was established in 2021, however, the elections that were expected to mark the beginning of a process of reconciliation and

**State capture of non-state violence: state's cooptation of pre-existing militias and their integration within the state's broader strategy**

socio-political unity in Libya were never held. The demands for democratic reforms voiced during the Arab Spring protests went largely unheeded, while Libya has remained without a unified government to this day.

- 2011 – Outbreak of the civil war against Gaddafi
- 2011 – NATO intervention
- October 2011 – Death of Gaddafi
- 2011–2012 – Transitional government
- 2014 – Second civil war and division into two rival governments
- 2019 – Haftar’s offensive against the Tripoli-based government
- 2021 – Establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU)
- 2021–present – Postponement of elections

**Hybrid warfare refers to the interaction of militias and foreign actors in Libya that has fragmented state authority and prevented the consolidation of a unified government since 2011.**

## From uprising to insecurity: Libya’s post-Arab Spring security landscape

The impact of the Arab Spring on Libya’s security is often underestimated. The revolution that violently overthrew Gaddafi took place in a historically fragmented and destabilized context, dismantling the precarious and oppressive kind of “stability” experienced under the dictatorship. To this day, Libya’s political fragmentation reflects the absence of the democratic and unified institutions demanded by those who took to the streets in 2011, and the situation remains far from resolved.


The aim of this paper is to highlight how the political upheavals triggered by the Arab Spring have had, and continue to have, an impact on Libya’s security, by outlining some of the most relevant dynamics

underlying the country’s long-term fragmentation and instability.

## The proliferation of non-state armed groups

Gaddafi had deliberately weakened and fragmented the security apparatus to prevent potential coups, avoiding the development of a unified and effective national army, by relying on a series of agreements with local tribes, which ensured the security of his regime without posing any threat to it. His coup-proofing strategy (Quinlivan, 1999) consisted in deliberately fragmenting military power and grounding

### Libya: Who controls what?



2011 – Arab Spring

security of his regime on the loyalty of tribes and militias, to which he granted territorial control and integration within the security forces.

When the Arab Spring uprisings initially began as a pacific movement, Gaddafi's security forces responded brutally, resulting in a violent crackdown on the uprisings. However, as the protests intensified, divisions emerged within the military, especially when the army was ordered to repress in blood the popular upheaval. While units based in the western part of the country largely remained loyal to Gaddafi, many in the east defected, joining and supporting emerging armed groups by providing weapons, training, and military expertise to the revolution (Dellai, 2025).


Almost three hundreds of the functioning militia forces were created on the tribal, regional, political or religious bases during the civil war in 2011. Each group was unique in its size, command structures, political and economic objectives, status, territorial control and allegiance (Lacher, 2011). As these armed groups gained control of cities and regions previously held by regime security forces, they replaced existing authorities, resulting in the emergence of a hybrid political order.

When the National Transition Council (NTC), a transitional government established by the victorious rebels to design and implement a pacification and state-building process, was formed, its relationship with the armed groups became one of the most pressing security challenges to deal with. The NTC could do nothing if not institutionalizing these non-state actors by incorporating them into formal structures and relying on them to provide security (Dellai,

2025). In fact, the fragmented security framework designed by Gaddafi during his regime prevented the state from establishing a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Therefore, the absence of a central authority capable of enforcing order, in addition to triggering the rapid proliferation of armed groups, compelled the NTC and subsequent transitional governments to integrate the various armed groups into the country's security sector, relying on them to provide stability. As a matter of fact, it is not unusual for states, particularly those affected by severe internal crises and civil wars, to resort to the state-capture of non-state violence in order to advance their strategic interests. In this context, they exploit pre-existing armed militias through processes of co-optation and integrate them into broader state strategies. By doing so, Libyan governments could enhance their military capacity, while militias, in turn, could gain legitimacy, access to resources, and increased political influence by aligning themselves with state authorities. This strategy was illustrative of the fact that the same NTC's legitimacy was built on these non-state actors and their ability to garner local support (McQuinn, 2015).

After the successful defeat of the regime, despite the newly formed NTC policy of disarmament, non-state armed groups were institutionalized and incorporated into formal state structures, deputizing them to provide security in Libya (Wehrey, 2012). Moreover, the control over oil resources located across different areas of the country reinforced their authority, enabling them to extract revenues and leverage oil as a bargaining tool against the government in exchange for power, legitimacy and military authority (Constantini, 2016).

## LIBYA: POLITICAL DIVISION AND ENERGY SOURCES



Armed groups have positioned themselves as de facto authorities in different large regions, and they have no incentive to allow a change in the status quo, and this is evident in the frequent attacks against civilians and regional administrative offices during electoral periods (Ali, 2025). These non-state armed groups have played a major role in stalling country's political transition as they tend to align and support rulers who refuse to cede power and the militias themselves act in order to create unfavourable conditions that make free and fair elections impossible (Ali, 2025).

Non-state militias' role in Libya's political transition has proven to be both necessary and sufficient in perpetuating the current state of political uncertainty, making the prospects of meaningful political change in Libya increasingly

uncertain. Their necessity stems from their pivotal position as key security providers, making them indispensable to any political establishment. Their sufficiency is nevertheless demonstrated by their ability to obstruct progress towards democratic transition (Ali, 2025).

These patterns are deeply rooted in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Libya, which dismantled state institutions, left a profound power vacuum and empowered a multiplicity of armed actors. Consequently, the incorporation of militias into state strategies reflects both the enduring weakness of central authority and the reconfiguration of power triggered by the uprising.

## Foreign influence and proxy dynamics

The Libyan crisis that emerged from the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring and culminated in the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime can be understood as a complex interplay of domestic, regional, and international dynamics. This multifaceted political environment continues to raise urgent security, economic, and political challenges, which are directly attributable not so much to the causes of the Arab Spring as to the outcome of the revolution, and remain highly relevant today.

Within this framework, the involvement of regional and international powers has further complicated an already fragile landscape. Beyond the historical contingencies and structural factors that have shaped Libya's political, economic, and social framework over recent decades, the interests of external international actors have significantly influenced state–society relations. These influences have also affected the ways in which non-state actors engage with central authorities.

Neighbouring countries, in particular, have often pursued utilitarian policies, exerting limited yet strategic unilateral influence aimed at maintaining a condition of managed instability. While such approaches may serve short-term interests, they ultimately pose serious risks to Libya's territorial integrity.

Operationally, the direct support provided by foreign powers to competing actors has exacerbated fragmentation. This includes the co-option of local non-state actors (Badi, 2021) in

efforts to combat the Islamic State and to control migration flows. Such interventions have deepened divisions within Libyan society, reinforcing localized power structures.

As a consequence, various constituencies and their affiliated non-state actors increasingly perceive foreign backing as a crucial means of consolidating their position and asserting legitimacy at the domestic level. This dynamic has encouraged local actors to actively seek political and military support from external states, thereby further undermining the possibility of establishing a cohesive central authority capable of unifying disparate groups under a shared national vision (Badi, 2021).

During the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya played a relatively influential regional role, leveraging its growing prestige and status to shape the policies of neighbouring countries. It did so through a combination of security arrangements, patronage networks, and direct interference in domestic affairs, particularly targeting its sub-Saharan neighbours.

Following the collapse of Gaddafi's regime, however, this dynamic was effectively reversed. Sub-Saharan countries, once the primary targets of Libyan influence, began to project their own power northwards into Libyan territory (Capasso, Dessi & Sanchez, 2019). This shift has significantly contributed to ongoing instability and fragmentation, especially in the southern regions of Libya.

In particular, countries such as Sudan, Chad, and Niger have exploited the political vacuum created in 2011 to establish ties and alliances with local armed groups and militias in Libya's

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southern regions (Capasso, Dessi & Sanchez, 2019). The policies they have pursued have included military support, the provision of weapons, and direct operations on Libyan territory. These actions have significantly contributed to plunging the already fragile southern areas into deeper instability, exacerbating the disorder that followed the political upheaval of the Arab Spring and the subsequent fall of the regime.

Beyond political motivations, the presence of foreign armed groups in southern Libya, along with the emergence of networks linking local militias with actors from neighbouring countries, has facilitated the transformation of the region into a hub for illicit activities. These include drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling, informal gold extraction, extortion, and, most notably, the ongoing and highly concerning trafficking of migrants.

By contrast, Libya's neighbouring regional actors such as Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt have moved in the opposite direction, viewing Libya's chronic instability as a direct threat to their own national security (Hamchi, 2012).

Algeria and Tunisia have, from the outset, adopted more cautious and stability-oriented approaches compared to Libya's sub-Saharan neighbours. They have avoided direct intervention, instead prioritizing diplomatic engagement over policies that could have further exacerbated an already deeply fragile situation.

For both countries, security has remained the primary concern. Their strategies have been grounded in a principle of formal non-interference, coupled with efforts to strengthen

border control in order to prevent jihadist infiltration and illicit trafficking. At the same time, they have consistently promoted political and diplomatic solutions among Libya's competing factions, often positioning themselves as mediators seeking to facilitate dialogue and de-escalation (Iratni, 2022).

Egypt is undoubtedly the country that has suffered the greatest economic losses following the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Since the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, more than two million Egyptian citizens who were employed as cheap labour in Libya chose to return home, depriving Egypt of approximately 33 million dollars in annual remittances (Iratni, 2022). Furthermore, Egypt had benefited from a significant volume of Libyan investments within its borders, as well as from a preferential channel for the importation of Libyan oil. Beyond these economic interests, Egypt shares with neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Algeria, a vital concern for the protection of its borders against Islamist militias that operated, and to a lesser extent continue to operate, in Libya (Mezran & Miller, 2017). Since the rise to power of President Al-Sisi, Egypt has pursued a policy of military eradication of Islamist militants, particularly in response to the growing number of attacks carried out by jihadist groups in the Sinai region (Iratni, 2022). The primary concern is that a convergence between terrorist groups active in the eastern parts of Libya and those operating within Egypt could lead to the destabilisation of the country. Consequently, Egypt became one of the principal states supporting General Haftar's government in the east of the country, particularly in his campaigns to liberate the province of Benghazi from Al-Qaeda and Daesh (Mezran & Miller, 2017).

Notwithstanding its evident alignment with the bloc of countries supportive of the faction led by Haftar (notably Russia, the UAE, France and Saudi Arabia), whose government is based in Tobruk, Egypt has in recent times recalibrated its strategic approach, choosing to assume a mediation role in the conflict. This shift has been driven by Egypt's desire to preserve its influence over the crisis and to prevent the growing assertiveness of other external actors from undermining its position as a key regional stakeholder (Lumeno, 2025).

Beyond the neighbouring countries most directly and geographically connected to Libya, several external powers and actors from outside the region also hold significant interests in Libya and pursue a variety of strategies and modes of intervention in order to safeguard different national interests. In doing so, they frequently interfere directly in Libya's internal affairs, contributing substantially to the country's national instability. The agendas of foreign powers with direct interests in Libya have been not only deeply intertwined and complex, but fundamentally divergent and at times extremely difficult to reconcile.

Nevertheless, the national security of these foreign powers does not appear to be as intimately threatened by the course of events in Libya as that of its immediate neighbours. The perceived threats emanating from Libya, such as terrorism and irregular migration, may indeed constitute serious challenges for these countries; however, they are neither as intricate nor as structurally embedded as those experienced by Libya's neighbouring states (Mezran & Miller, 2017).

Among the various actors bearing strategic and economic interests in Libya, I will focus on Turkey and Russia, which are undoubtedly the most heavily implicated in the country by virtue of their broader ambitions and designs for the Mediterranean region, in which Libya plays a key role (Dalay, 2021).

In practice, the two countries exploit the Libyan context to pursue an indirect confrontation (proxy war), advancing opposing and conflicting strategies and interests (Zoubir, 2020). This is clearly reflected in the factions supported by each of the two foreign actors: while Turkey aligned itself with the Government of National Accord (GNA) during the Second Libyan Civil War, whose assistance proved both necessary and decisive in halting the large-scale offensive launched by the Libyan National Army, Russia has sustained and developed economic and political relations with the parallel government of General Haftar, who serves as the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) itself, together with France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Group, 2020).

Turkey's objectives in Libya, pursued primarily through its partnership with the GNA (until 2021) and subsequently with the GNU, form part of a broader political strategy aimed at enhancing Turkey's prestige and relevance in the Mediterranean region. Through its direct security and defence commitment to the Tripoli-based government, which has seen Turkey emerge as a strategic military partner by providing support in the form of troops, weapons, and financing, Turkey has established itself as GNU's foremost strategic partner (Iratni, 2022). This close alignment and convergence of interests do not stem solely from the historical ties between the

two countries but rather conceal broader and very much current Turkish strategic ambitions in the Mediterranean.

The most compelling example of Turkey's tangible gains in Libya is the memorandum signed by the two countries, which entailed a redrawing of their maritime boundaries, resulting in the establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Group, 2020). The memorandum of 27 November 2019 delineated new maritime borders within an area of 18.6 nautical miles (approximately 35 kilometres), within which the two countries may exclusively exercise economic and energy cooperation, enabling Turkey to conduct exploratory activities across a significantly larger portion of the eastern Mediterranean, extending from the southwestern coast of the Anatolian peninsula to the northeastern coast of Libya (Lumeno, 2025). On 13 October 2022, Libya and Turkey renewed the memorandum, providing for further cooperation in hydrocarbon exploration in Libyan territorial waters and on Libyan soil, as well as in bilateral scientific, technological, legal, administrative, and commercial domains (Quamar, 2020).

memoranda and partnership agreements with the Tripoli government, notably concerning Al-Watiya military airport, and with the Central Bank of Libya (Lumeno, 2025), with the aim of enhancing economic and military cooperation between the two nations.

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Ankara seeks to use the Libyan platform to legitimize a stronger presence in the Mediterranean and to exert its influence over the North African region (Mezran & Miller, 2017).

The main Turkish antagonist in the context of the proxy war fought in Libya is undoubtedly Russia, the principal political and material supporter of the government led by General Khalifa Haftar. Russia's strategy in Libya responds to its growing need and ambition to play a more active and influential role on the African continent. In this regard, Libya occupies a strategic position as a gateway to the Sahel, with ports such as Tobruk and Derna considered crucial for the Russian navy (Iratni, 2022). Although Russia perceived the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), which established a no-fly zone over Libya, as a defeat, since 2014 it has progressively strengthened its presence in the country through more or less covert and hybrid strategies (Lumeno, 2025).

Once again, Libya's central position in the Mediterranean and its wealth of energy resources have played a decisive role in shaping Russia's presence and influence in the territory. Russia views Libya as a crucial strategic foothold at the gateway to the Sahel and, more broadly, to the African continent, which can be used by Moscow as a launching point for its expansionist policies in the region (Capasso, Czerep, Dessi, & Sanchez (2019). Indeed, through the provision of military assistance to Haftar's forces and its physical presence on the ground, Moscow has managed to secure control over large areas of Libya thanks to important port concessions, military bases, and ad hoc energy agreements (Lumeno, 2025).

The strategy pursued consists in intervening, often indirectly, to strengthen Haftar's faction through the use of mercenaries and contractors who join and support the forces of the Libyan National Army (Joffé, 2020). Haftar's 2019 offensive, aimed at seizing control of the regions held by the Tripoli-based government, highlighted the significant presence of Russian mercenaries and contractors, including the Wagner Group, within the ranks operating out of Tobruk (Lefèvre, 2017).

This low-cost strategy has allowed Moscow to become an indispensable actor in the Libyan context, despite not intervening directly in the conflict.

As already seen in Syria (Dalay, 2021), Russia exploits its ability to intervene in distant conflict theatres with the aim and ambition of becoming an external power capable of influencing political balances (Mezran & Miller, 2017). This policy combines official diplomatic tools with the use of private and semi-private actors (such as the Wagner Group) (Barabanov & Ibrahim, 2021), which are indirectly under the direct control of Moscow. Russia views Libya as an important arena for external projection, useful for reaffirming its status as a global power. Its involvement in Libya is part of a *modus operandi* already tested in Syria, based on the integration of military instruments and economic opportunities (Capasso, Czerep, Dessi, & Sanchez (2019)).

It is therefore not surprising that the idea of a unified, democratic, and free Libya, such as the one envisioned during the Arab Spring uprisings, appears to be an almost utopian goal. The persistence of external interference, combined with the entrenchment of fragmented local power

structures, has continued to undermine prospects for political consolidation. In this sense, the legacy of the Arab Spring in Libya is not only one of unfulfilled aspirations, but also of a protracted and externally influenced process of instability and state fragmentation.

### **Conclusion: Libya today, between fragmented authorities and a pathway towards the Arab Springs' aspirations?**

The Libyan case illustrates how the outcomes of the Arab Spring have produced effects that extend far beyond the initial revolutionary moment. Rather than leading to democratic consolidation, institutional stability and economic development, the collapse of the Gaddafi regime generated a structural vacuum in which state authority was rapidly replaced by a multiplicity of armed actors and competing centres of power. The proliferation of militias, initially embedded within the revolutionary process and later institutionalised as security providers, has entrenched a fragmented security landscape in which coercive power is dispersed and political authority remains contested.

At the same time, sustained external interference has further consolidated this fragmentation, transforming Libya into an arena of competing regional and international agendas that often reinforce, rather than resolve, internal divisions. In this context, foreign involvement has not merely exacerbated instability but has become structurally embedded in Libya's political order, contributing to the persistence of parallel institutions and rival governments.

These dynamics were further institutionalised by the repeated failure of electoral processes, most notably the collapse of the 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, which exposed unresolved disputes over political legitimacy, legal frameworks, and institutional authority (Ashwayra, 2026). Rather than marking a turning point towards unification, the post-electoral period instead consolidated a dual institutional structure, with rival governments in Tripoli and the east each claiming legitimacy and external backing.

This fragmentation is further reflected in recent diplomatic developments. The most significant political meeting of recent years took place in Rome on 3 September 2025, between Saddam Haftar and Ibrahim Dbeibah, nephew and advisor to the GNU prime minister, facilitated jointly by the United States and Italy. Notably, this meeting did not involve formal heads of state, nor did it take place in Libya, nor between elected representatives. This detail alone highlights the extent to which Libya's political process has become detached from institutional legitimacy, raising concerns that its division risks evolving not only into a political stalemate, but increasingly into a dynastic configuration of power.

In August 2025, UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) presented a new 12 to 18 month roadmap to the UN Security Council aimed at unifying institutions and holding elections. However, Russia has already publicly dismissed the plan, describing its deadlines as "artificial." Whether this initiative will succeed where previous efforts have failed remains, as of today, a matter of ongoing debate. What is clear, however, is that without addressing the

structural conditions outlined in this study, any new institutional framework risks reproducing the same cycle of fragility. Libya's post-2011 trajectory thus reflects not only the breakdown of authoritarian rule, but also the enduring inability to reconstruct a unified political order, where domestic fragmentation and external intervention continue to operate in a mutually reinforcing cycle that obstructs any sustainable process of state-building and national reconciliation.

Surprisingly, as of April 2026, for the first time since the fall of Gaddafi, a unified national budget has been approved and shared by both competing Libyan governments (Zaptia, 2026). Whether this development merely reflects a pragmatic alignment of interests between the two administrations or instead marks the beginning of a genuine process of reconciliation capable of reviving the original demands of the Arab Spring, remains, at present, an open and unresolved question.

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