The Transnational Engine of Tren de Aragua

The Transnational Engine of Tren de Aragua

Fracia Baeke and Andrea Kuoman

Latin America has often been dubbed as the most violent region in the world (Albarracín,

2023; COPLA, 2016), citing the levels of crime and the extent of violence appropriated by

criminal actors. This has created a context of instability and uncertainty, further encouraging

populations directly impacted to look to alternative opportunities that are safer and more

stable. In parts of Latin America, it is the organised crime itself that has created or

exacerbated humanitarian crises, as the extremely high levels of homicide and other violent

crime have caused major population displacements (Humanitarian outcomes, 2021, p.8).

According to a 2021 report from the International Crisis Group, Honduras and El Salvador

have an estimated 833,600 people displaced in large part by criminal violence (ICG, 2021).

The resulting humanitarian crisis becomes a pressing question for the management of

forced migration and displacement, law enforcement, and citizen security, particularly when

organised crime groups (OCGs) are at the helm steering the crisis. This article seeks to

outline how Tren De Aragua appropriated the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela to transform

from a prison-based gang into a diversified transnational criminal network.

Defining Organised Crime

As organised crime (OC) fluctuates across time and space, it remains a challenge to pin down

a precise definition that is applicable throughout history and in every context. The United

Nations has attempted to provide a working definition, approaching OC as an “enterprise ...

that [rationally] works to profit from illicit activities” whose existence is “maintain[ed]

through corruption [...], intimidation, threats or force to protect its operations” (UNODC,

2018). The 2000 Palermo Convention goes beyond this working definition, identifying

serious crime and the groups that partake in such criminal activity, noting the involvement of

three or more persons, the aim to commit at least one serious crime, and the aim of gaining

financial or material benefit (UNODC, 2004, p.5).

Academia has gone beyond this and has attempted to bring nuance to this understanding of

OC by approaching it as an economic, political, cultural, and social phenomenon (cf. Von

Lampe, 2015). These approaches have highlighted the role of class struggle as marginalised

social groups respond to an oppressive regime (cf. Pearce, 1976; Woodiwiss, 2001),

identified various organisational designs, notably the use of a hierarchical structure implying

social ties and labour division (cf. Abadinsky, 2013; Fijnaut et al, 1998; Godson, 2003), the

importance of territorial control (cf. Santoro, 2022), and the context of the types of criminal

or illicit activities that the groups partake in (cf. Von Lampe, 2015). Each framing brings its

own refinement and analysis, but fails to fully capture the exact breadth and scope that OC

may manifest as.

The World Bank (2025, p.79) underlined the issue of the lack of a standardised definition of

crime at a regional level in Latin America, further complicated by the federal systems with

multiple penal codes in a single country. Observations suggest that organised crime groups

(OCGs) increasingly have a fragmented structure and participate in a diverse set of criminal

activities, particularly when territorial control is an important feature of the local criminal

landscape (Paúl, 2024). Uribe Ruan (2021) notes that OC in Latin America remains quite

abstract as a construct, as crime is typically committed by disorganised, fragmented and

unstable groups that make up networks spread throughout the region. Albarracín (2023)

observes that this flexible approach focused on the activities rather than the structure

allows for the use of a broader source selection and an analysis of OCGs that is ultimately

shaped by the angle adopted, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the complex

nature of OC.

Theoretical Framework

Criminology has traditionally approached studying and understanding crime as a function of

an actor’s behaviour, a structural phenomenon, or the factors that influence it. Few theories

have tried to approach it in a multifaceted way as Routine Activity Theory has (Cohen &

Felson, 1979). The theory proposes the criminal actor, location, and lack of protection for

the target victim as key factors that inform the prediction and prevention of crime. Becker’s

(1963) Outsider Theory, building on labelling theory, complements this multifaceted

approach, suggesting that individuals may mold themselves to the expectations of being

labelled as an ‘offender’ for breaking an established group social norm. Mailey’s (2024)

report on the 2023 Sudan conflict highlights the link between arms trafficking and the

humanitarian crisis, with the latter being fueled by the instability and insecurity of illicit

networks and commoditised violence. Geneva Solutions reports that organised crime often

generates hunger, poverty and displacement in already vulnerable communities, affecting

the delivery of humanitarian assistance to in-need populations (Dupraz-Dobias, 2023).

The perspective of a lack of protection for vulnerable populations has been a central aspect

of organised crime studies. Gambetta (1993) outlines the offer of private protection as a

defining entrepreneurial characteristic of OCGs. Specifically, the notion of the “mafia” arose

as an alternative protection provider when the state is unable to maintain a monopoly of

protection, ie. lacking the ability to protect the population (Santoro, 2022).

An important notion to understand here is the concept of polycriminality, how various

criminal markets eventually overlap (USAID, 2020). A prime example often cited is the

overlap between smuggling routes and human-trafficking, or migrant smuggling, routes

(UNODC, 2024). Understanding polycriminality is central to the understanding of organised

criminal actors as being inherently economic as material gain acts as a core incentive for

criminal activities (Abadinsky, 2013; Finckenauer, 2005; Varese, 2001; Wang, 2017). This is

motivated not only by a profit-oriented mindset, but also the need to spread risks and to

adapt to new markets, much like a legal firm (Global Organised Crime Index, 2025).

Ultimately, criminal actors are especially flexible, operate at a transnational level, and are no

longer limited to a single criminal market.

Polycriminality marks a shift in the criminal landscape, noting a sophistication not seen

before. The rise of “third-generation gangs” shows a shift from the market-based business

operations of “second-generation gangs” by expanding informal political and social influence

and aiming to operate at a global level (Sullivan, 2007). Such groups become transnational

by connecting communities facing the shared challenge of a “disintegrating social structure”

in intricate networks that establish a distinct community culture (Sullivan, 2006, p.492-3).

Such networks, often built on cultural or national identities, have played a key role in

ensuring the transnational nature of modern OCGs, particularly in Latin America (Garzón et

al, 2013; Zaitch, 2002).

Historical Context

Tren de Aragua does not emerge in a vacuum; it condenses centuries of Latin American illicit

economies into a single criminal entity. Since the colonial era, the region has been

characterized by smuggling, human trafficking, and illicit mining of gold and silver, resulting

in parallel marketplaces reliant on corruption and private violence. Smugglers, local elites,

and crown officials conspired to evade the quinto real (royal fifth) tax, while pirates and

corsairs functioned as tolerated intermediates when it aligned with imperial goals (Lane,

1998). Post-independence, Latin American republics exhibited budgetary and military frailty,

characterized by restricted territorial control and powerful regional caudillos, which

facilitated ongoing banditry, local warlordism, and private protection economies to thrive

(Centeno, 2002).

In the late twentieth century, cocaine altered this landscape. Colombian and later Mexican

cartels set up vertically integrated systems to control production, trafficking routes, and

wholesale distribution. Brazilian prison-based groups like Comando Vermelho and Primeiro

Comando da Capital (PCC) displayed how prisons could become centers of criminal

governance (Lessing, 2021, p.854-873). The region transitioned from a limited number of

cartels to a fragmented landscape of poly-criminal organisations controlling various

territories and populations. Tren de Aragua (TdA) is a product of this evolution. It takes on

colonial patterns of collusion and modern trends of diversification and prison-based power,

but it also adds something new: it is built around the mass migration and humanitarian crisis

in Venezuela and spreads outward through transnational mobility (Rísquez, 2023; Pérez

Guadalupe et al., 2025).

From Construction Site to Prison Kingdom

Tren de Aragua (TdA) started out as a failed infrastructure project. The Venezuelan

government started building an ambitious railway in Aragua state in the late 2000s. Around

these construction sites, workers and union representatives started to steal materials, extort

contractors, and modify the hiring process. Rísquez (2023) explains how this environment of

predatory unionism and petty racketeering led to what would later be called “Tren de

Aragua,” or “the train” of Aragua. The Aragua Penitentiary Center, also known as Tocorón

prison, is where the gang’s logic changed when key members of these rackets were arrested.

Inside Tocorón, the conditions were ideal for criminals to come together. After deadly riots in

2011, the Chávez government unofficially gave the pranes, or inmate bosses, the power to

keep order inside the prison. In exchange for less open violence, the state gave up control of

daily life. Pranes were in charge of food distribution, access to weapons, visiting rights, and

settling disputes (InSight Crime, 2025). Tocorón became a semi-autonomous enclave where

the state kept the walls but lost its power. In this setting, Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero

Flores, also known as “Niño Guerrero,” became the most powerful pran; already found guilty

of murder and drug trafficking. He set up a strict hierarchy and a system of internal taxation

called la causa, which required each prisoner to pay for protection and basic services

(Rísquez, 2023). Non-payment led to punishments that were staged, starting with beatings

and going up to gunshots and execution; creating an atmosphere of fear and obedience.

Tren de Aragua turned Tocorón into a “prison kingdom” by taking resources from prisoners

and using money from extortion and trafficking outside of prison. Investigations by

journalists and NGOs found that the prison even had restaurants, nightclubs, a swimming

pool, a zoo, a baseball field, and shops (Radford & Buschschlüter, 2023). All of these were

paid for by inmates and run by gangs. Families of gang members lived inside, and security

guards took orders from the prisoners. Tocorón served as Guerrero’s headquarters, safe

haven, and symbol of impunity all at the same time. Most importantly, TdA was not confined

to the prison walls. The gang did things that looked like charity work in nearby communities

through the front group Somos El Barrio JK. They gave out food, sponsored events, and set

their own rules (Pérez Guadalupe et al., 2025). In areas where the Venezuelan government

was largely absent, the gang took over as the alternative authority, settling arguments,

punishing “bad” behavior, and taxing business activity. What started as a predatory union

racket grew into a hybrid criminal-political actor rooted in a prison extending tentacles into

other parts of society within a decade.

In September 2023, the Maduro government sent about 11,000 soldiers and police to

Tocorón to “retake it” as part of “Operation Guaicaipuro” (McDermott, 2023). Authorities

found recreational facilities, stockpiles of rifles, grenades, heavy weapons, advanced

communication systems, and tunnels connecting the prison to the outside world. But just

before this situation happened, the “Niño Guerrero” and dozens of his top lieutenants got

away. This raid sped up a process that was already going on: moving away from its original

prison hub and relying more on its network of external cells. It did not break up the group;

but it made it act more like a transnational franchise and less like a prison-based hierarchy.

A Diversified Criminal Portfolio

By the time the police raided Tocorón, Tren de Aragua had a wide range of criminal activities.

Extortion was still a main and steady source of income. In Venezuela, the gang charged

businesses in areas it controlled. Outside of Venezuela, it went after small shops, street

vendors, and transportation companies. For instance, in Peru, complaints of extortion went

from about 3,000 in 2018 to more than 21,000 by 2024 (Pérez Guadalupe et al., 2025).

While this cannot be blamed only on TdA, Peruvian police and prosecutors consistently point

to Venezuelan gangs linked to TdA as the main cause of the new wave of extortion.

The gang also specialises in contract killings (sicariato) and kidnappings. In many host

countries, police reports show that professionalized murders, which often involve

dismemberment or displaying bodies in public, have increased since TdA-linked cells arrived

(InSight Crime, 2025). Such acts generate income through paid hits and signal dominance to

rivals and communities.

TdA is also a major player in the business of human smuggling. The group charges migrants

to cross the border between Colombia and Venezuela and through routes like the Darién

Gap. When debts cannot be paid, smuggling often turns into trafficking. Migrants who are

unable to pay their full fees are forced to work as drug couriers, lookouts, or in forced labor;

women are especially forced into sex work. In Rísquez (2023) formulation, the gang has

switched the merchandise from drugs to people.

The gang’s systematic use of human trafficking and sexual exploitation is more distinctive.

TdA has built networks for prostitution and trafficking that follow Venezuelans who have

moved to other countries. Investigations into a TdA group in Lima called “Los Gallegos”

revealed a structured system of debt bondage: women from Venezuela, Colombia, or

Ecuador were recruited with promises of legal work, then forced into prostitution to pay off

travel “debts,” facing nightly quotas and punitive fines (Pérez Guadalupe et al., 2025). Police

suspected that one Lima-based cell made more than $1 million a year from sexual

exploitation. In Chile and Colombia, where Venezuelan women and children are more likely

to be victims of trafficking, similar patterns have been seen (UNODC, 2024).

Beyond these headline activities, TdA displays marked criminal entrepreneurship. It has

gotten into baseball academies in Venezuela, where it demands a cut of young players’ MLB

signing bonuses and threatens to kill anyone who refuses to pay up (Ferré-Sadurní &

Marcius, 2024). In the south, the gang is involved in illegal gold mining, extorting miners or

controlling pits alongside or against other armed actors. In migrant-receiving cities, it

practises loansharking (gota a gota), giving micro-loans to vendors and mototaxi drivers at

very high interest rates that are enforced through violence. There is also growing proof that

younger recruits are using their digital skills to commit cybercrime and financial fraud, like

stealing phones, taking over accounts, and running online scams.

Across these markets, the gang’s modus operandi combines extreme but instrumental

brutality with strategic flexibility. Dismemberments, corpses in bags, and filmed executions

are all ways to scare people and competitors. Yet TdA usually prefers co-optation to

long-term war. When it moves into new areas, it offers rival groups a chance to join its

network. Violence is more of a way to control the market and demonstrate territory than an

end in itself.

Exploiting Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis

Tren de Aragua’s transnationalization is both a result of and a response to the humanitarian

crisis in Venezuela. Since 2015, about 7.9 million Venezuelans have left the country and

about 6.7 million of them are still in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNHCR, 2024). This

mass migration has led to crowded diasporic corridors and dangerous migrant settlements.

The crisis was a push and pull factor for the gang. The economy’s collapse made “extortable”

wealth at home less valuable. Businesses went out of business, wages fell, and the amount

of money made from kidnapping went down. To keep making money and running the

business, TdA “followed the people.” As Venezuelans moved to Colombia, Peru, Chile, and

other places, the gang found new markets in those countries that paid in dollars and took

advantage of the migrants’ vulnerabilities.

Migrants provide cover, manpower, and victims. TdA operatives can get into host countries

as regular refugees because border crossings are often chaotic and identity checks are few

and far between. Young Venezuelan men who are unemployed and looked down upon are

easy targets for recruitment, especially if they have ties to gangs or prison culture. At the

same time, undocumented immigrants who work informally are easy targets for extortion

and coercion because they are afraid of the police, often lack legal literacy, and have weak

social networks. Women and LGBTQ+ migrants are at greater risk of being exploited by TdA

networks, which explains their overrepresentation among trafficking victims (UNODC, 2024;

Pérez Guadalupe et al., 2025).

This combination creates a criminal diaspora within a migrant diaspora. While the vast

majority of Venezuelan migrants adhere to the law, the conduct of a small segment

influences public perception and policy. High-profile crimes associated with Venezuelan

gangs in Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia have exacerbated xenophobic narratives

equating “Venezuelan” with “dangerous.” In the United States, the TdA gang has been

referenced in political discourse to justify large-scale deportations and strict asylum

procedures, even when evidence of gang affiliation is limited (Ferré-Sadurní & Marcius,

2024). This politicized framing can lead to collective punishment and hinder integration

efforts, ultimately expanding the pool of individuals susceptible to recruitment and

exploitation.

In conclusion, Tren de Aragua crystallises a broader transformation in Latin American

organised crime: from monolithic, drug-centric cartels to flexible, poly-criminal networks

that operate through dispersed cells and franchised “brands.” Simultaneously, it elucidates

the crime-migration nexus, demonstrating how prison-derived organisations can extend

their influence beyond national boundaries by infiltrating humanitarian corridors and

susceptible diasporic populations. Further, this case warns that narrow security responses

are not only insufficient but potentially counterproductive if they are not accompanied by

institutional change, migrant protection, and social policy that address the governance,

inequality, and protection gaps on which such organisations thrive.

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