The role and potential of Jubaland and Puntland

Constructive or destructive? The role and potential of Jubaland’s Madobe and Puntland’s Deni in Somali stability and state-building

By Jakob Dehner

Introduction

The Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Somalia is accounting for over 10 percent of global trade in 2024, connecting Africa, Asia and Europe (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2024; p. 1). A secure and stable Somalia is therefore vital for the economic interest of several state and non-state actors. These international stakeholders assisted in the creation of a federal structure in Somalia. In this sense, “federalism is viewed as a strategy for rebuilding the state by empowering regional administrations, addressing local grievances, and fostering national integration“ (Barise, et al., 2025; p. 5). However, critical analyses describe that “the status of the Somali state as unified, stable, and sovereign has been an elusive goal for generations of Somali citizen“ (Hared, et al., 2025; p. 25). This has created an environment, in which access to power enables to access and distribute external rents as a mean to generate wealth (Hared, et al., 2025; p. 28ff). The most recent row has been the approval of controversial constitutional amendments by the federal parliament despite broad political opposition headed by the administrations of the federal states Jubaland and Puntland (SomaliGuardian, 2026a).

These dynamics add to the fragile situation for Somali state-building efforts, which have reached a new turning point with the recognition of Somaliland by Israel in late December 2025 (Minich, et al., 2026). Tel Aviv’s decision is noticeable as the Horn of Africa is increasingly shaped by the power competition between the Egypt-Saudi Arabia- Türkiye and the Ethiopia-Israel-United Arab Emirates (UAE) axis. Additionally, the resurgence of Al-Shabaab combined with the further financing of AUSSOM under scrutiny, and the upcoming presidential elections add to the challenges regarding comprehensive state-building (International Crisis Group, 2025; p. 2). Considering the importance attached to Somalia’s strategic and economic position at the Horn of Africa, the prospect of renewed state collapse and increasing instability remains undesirable. As most recent analyses of the situation have primarily focused on external factors shaping Somali policies and dynamics, they are neglecting the role and potential advocacy of Somali actors themselves. To this end, the present paper aims to provide insight into the role of two notable figures in Somali politics, Ahmed Mohamed Islam, commonly known as Ahmed Madobe, President of Jubaland, and Saeed Abdullahi Deni, President of Puntland. Both Jubaland and Puntland are federal states of the Republic of Somalia and are recurringly drawing attention by internal and external actors due to their stability, resources, and strategic ports, such as Kismayo Port.

However, it is important to note that internal and external factors shaping Somali politics cannot be observed independently from another. While recent years have indicated an increase in the autonomy and the ability to shape politics by internal actors, remarks by the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, demonstrate the persisting influence of external actors (SomaliGuardian, 2025h). In this context, both federal and state leaders are keen to secure the support of external actors such as Ethiopia, Kenya, or the UAE for their agendas as visa-verse (SomaliGuardian, 2025). While external partners observe the developments in Somalia in a larger regional context and view Somalia as a piece in a larger playing field (Tsamalashvili, 2026; p. 10f), their agendas still require local implementation and partners. To that end, Somali politicians can use this leverage to advance their own agendas, while “it also increases volatility and uncertainty“ (Donelli, 2025). A similar important, but less transparent and analyzed influence is attached to the fragmented clan system (Hared, et al., 2025; p. 26). While this analysis will take the presented factors into account, it aims at focusing on the role and agency of the persons under investigation. After elaborating the notion of strongman applied in political science, the paper consequently investigates whether Jubaland’s Madobe and Puntland’s Deni can be characterized as political actors decisively shaping their environment. The results indicate on their constructive or destructive role in further state-building efforts in Somali. The paper concludes with a prospect into future Somali stability and state-building.

The Notion of Strongmen in Politics

The usage of the term strongman does not follow a consistent definition in political science. However, there are notable notions developed in recent years aiming at explaining an emerging style of leadership. As such, Slater defines strongman as military leader or leader with a military audience, which are largely unconstrained in their actions (Slater, 2003; p. 86). Applying Slater’s model, Weeks finds that “given the treacherous road to power in a personalist dictatorship, these unconstrained leaders are often precisely the types of individuals who seek out international conflict and can survive defeat, only to repeat the cycle“ (Weeks, 2012; p. 343). Rachman presents another characterisation of the strongman (Rachman, 2016). Internally, strongmans are perceived to stand up for ordinary people against an external enemy, such as globalist elites. Externally, they are the embodiment of the nation, while encouraging a cult of personality. Treisman and Guriev add, that strongmen do not rule through the threat of violence and fear, but instead through the manipulation and the control over information (Treisman, et al., 2023). More specifically, they curtail democratic and liberal freedoms, while using the state’s power against rivals to remain unchallenged. In such, journalists are expected to function as an arm of the government spreading often nativist and anti-institutional rhetorics (Walker, 2018). Exemplary, in the case of Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Darwisheh points out that Sisi has successfully positioned himself as the strongmen, who is “to be the pillar of Egypt’s stability and security“ (Darwisheh, 2019; p. 70). As democracy and strong political parties bring insecurity and instability, “Sisi claims that the people have delegated authority to him rather than elected institutions“ (Darwisheh, 2019; p. 70). This result aligns with the findings by Han, that the upper and lower classes are in general more attracted by strongman rule, either as the promise of preserving existing privileges or by being appealed to the sense of order, direction, and inclusion (Han, 2025; p. 6). Ahmed Madobe: President of Jubaland (2012 – ongoing).

Ahmed Madobe is since 2013 the first and only president of the Somali federal state of Jubaland. Before, he was already the Head of the Jubaland Administration since his seizure of Kismayo in 2012. He was re-elected twice in 2019 and 2024, although both elections led to controversies with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). While his origins remain largely speculative, he first appeared in public when he joined the Islamist Al-Iti-haad-al-Islamiya in 1991 (The Africa Report, 2012). A member of the Ogaden tribe present in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, his “own deal-making led him from alliances with Islamist militias to fighting against Ethiopian forces and successive regimes in Mogadishu, and then to an alliance with Kenya, which invaded Somalia in October 2011“ (The Africa Report, 2012). When he split with Al-Shabaab in 2010 (Voice of America, 2010), he conquered Kismayo with Kenyan help in 2012. After Mogadishu, under Ethiopian and Kenyan pressure, agreed to the establishment of a federal state in Jubaland (Plaut, 2013), Madobe was elected president in 2013, while the FGS backed initially another candidate (Jorgic, 2013). The external support for Madobe against the FGS by Ethiopia and Kenya has continued until today (SomaliGuardian, 2025i). This support is due to the interest of Somalia’s neighbours to both establish a buffer zone towards the Islamist groups, and to continue their own influence on the economic and political development of Somalia (SomaliGuardian, 2025i). However, Madobe has moved to position himself internally and externally as the embodiement and voix populi of the people of Jubaland and Somalia. Exemplarary, he presented his recent visit to Mogadishu amid constitutional talks as the attempt to “protect Somalia’s statehood and to find solutions to the existing disputes. We will not allow the state to be dismantled“ (Shabelle, 2026). This rhetorical device is frequently used by members of the opposition to the current Somali PresidentMohamud for his ambition to introduce universal suffrage (International Crisis Group, 2025; p. 1).

Madobe’s visit to Mogadishu takes places after a series of escalations between the FGS and the opposition, constituting itself as the Somali Future Council (SFC) (SomaliGuardian, 2025b). Especially the relations between Jubaland and Mogadishu have been strained, as Madobe claims that President Mohamud is acting contrary to the will of the Somali people, while Madobe would represent such (SomaliGuardian, 2025f). Another highly contested point between the FGS and Madobe is the latter’s re-election in 2024. Already his first re-election in 2019 was initially not recognised by Mogadishu, while Madobe promised dialogue with his opponents “to maintain the stability and development of the region“ (AlJazeera, 2019). While Mogadishu eventually recognized Madobe in 2020, after pressure from Kenya (France24, 2020), the most recent election outcome remains contested (SomaliGuardian, 2025f). In his 2024 victory speech, Madobe characterises himself as the only solution to ongoing troubles in Jubaland and as guardian against external interference (HornObserver, 2024). The latter speech is, compared to the speech in 2019, positioning Madobe more explicit as protector and voice of the people of Jubaland, with him being the only choice for stability and reconcilitation. However, critics point out that Madobe had to amend Jubaland’s constitution, as it previously limited the presidents term to two (Shino, 2024). Additionally, Madobe is accused that he wanted “to coronate himself through a flawed and uncontested electoral process“ , which’s votes were casted by a handpicked group of MPs (SomaliGuardian, 2024). As of that, the outcome “was widely anticipated“, while Madobe was able to claim: “I am the legitimate President of Jubaland and no one else holds that title“ (SomaliGuardian, 2024). To this end, Madobe is keen to secure his position by continuing to hinder the universal suffrage approach by the FGS, which has the potential (and ambition) of weakening his control over elections. At the same time, he can use this struggle to advance his position as the peoples advocate. After talks between the FGS and the SFC collapsed in February 2026, Madobe and his allies blaimed the failure on the FGS. While fraiming the proposed constitutional amendments as an attempt by the FGS to control the election outcome, the SFC and Madobe and positioning themselves as guardians of the will of the people in good faith against a corruptible central government (SomaliGuardian, 2026b). Concluding, Madobe is trying to position himself similarily to Egypt’s Sisi as the legitimate voix populi and as the only possible pillar of stability and security. However, juxtaposed to the former, Madobe relies on external back-up through primarily Ethiopia and Kenya against the FGS. This alliance will persist until either Madobe or one of his current allies lose their benefit of supporting their partner or find a more benefitable alternative. For Madobe, the best course of action is to continue strengthening hisdomestic position, while opposing a strong and stable central government in Mogadishu, which could undermine his autonomy and ambitions. Since neither Ethiopia nor Kenya share a desire for a strong Mogadishu, their ambitions remain align for the moment. However, Madobe’s position remains fragile in the long-term, as he cannot rely on an institutionalized regime, which can sustain a change of leadership. At the same time, Rachman has established that one of the main characteristics of strongman rule is the personalization of the regime. In such, Madobe is a notable example, as he rules a territory created for his ambition. Like Sisi, he can claim that the people and the tribe have delegated the power to him, rather than to Mogadishu. Consequently, the self- and alien-presentation of his rule and his ambitions towards the people will remain of upmost importance for Madobe. For this dynamic, it is within Madobe’s interest to both align himself with more powerful allies, as he has done previously, for the pursuit of common goals, and to frame these ambitions as beneficial for his people, not himself. Within the fulfillment of these conditions, Madobe can maintain and possible strengthen his position in Jubaland and generally Somalia. However, a strong and centralized government beyond his control and influence remains undesirable for him, without a equal compensation in terms of power and resources. Saeed Abdullahi Deni: President of Puntland (2019 - ongoing) The Puntland State of Somalia was established in 1998 as a semi-autonomous state amid the collapse of the central state authorities (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2022; p. 2). Contrary to Jubaland, Puntland has experienced peaceful transitions of power. The current president, Saeed Abdullahi Deni, was elected in 2019 after serving as Federal Minister for Planning and International Cooperation (Warsame, 2019).

According to the United Nations, “Puntland has enjoyed relative peace and has become a refuge for many Somalis displaced by violence in the South“ (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2022; p. 2). In this context, Hared and Abbas note that “Puntland is depicted as the founding state of federalism“ , which does not require a central authority to construct governance structures and to manage their own affairs (Hared, et al., 2025; p. 27). However, this understanding has opened gaps in the development of Puntland, which are filled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), “a key provider of security assistance and economic investment“ (Yasin, 2026). This dynamics creates tensions with Mogadishu, as Puntland relies “on a partner whose broader regional calculations may not align with Puntland’s long-term survival within a [sic] united Somalia“ (Yasin, 2026). This ambiguity is exemplified by Deni’s position during the recent struggles between the FGS and the SFC. Deni describes Puntland as the “spearhead [for] the re-establishment of a united and stable Somalia“ (SomaliGuardian, 2025g).

At the same time, Puntland opposed attempts by the FGS to centralize resources and revenue income away from the federal states, citing ambitions of external actors (SomaliGuardian, 2025c). In the case of the dispute over the implementation of centralized e-visa fees, Puntland receives backing from external actors, such as Ethiopia and the UAE (SomaliGuardian, 2025e). According to Tsamalashvili, the UAE is primarily interested in the containment of Islamist movements, the security of trade routes and the expansion of its influence (Tsamalashvili, 2025; p. 12). For its strategic position, Puntland has become a key area of attention in the regional power dynmicas. By supporting smaller entities such as Puntland or Somaliland, the UAE creates a deep dependency. A notable example of the possible advantages has been the accusation that the UAE has been using Puntland’s Bosaso Airport to transport weapons to the Sudanese Rapid Supply Forces (RSF) (SomaliGuardian, 2025d). This incident demonstrates that Puntland is perceived as a part of a larger strategy. This dynamic limits Deni’s scope of potential options. Additionally, there are other senior and vocal members of the Puntland administration, including former presidents. As they are momentarily united against Mogadishu, they form a united front against the FGS. Dissidents from this line of actions are excluded or suspended (SomaliGuardian,2025a). While Deni can rely on an supportive and institutionalized regime, a change of the current trajectory would need the approval of several other figures. Given the long-standing and deep impact of the relationship with the UAE, it is unlikely to change in the nearer future. A plausible way for Deni to increase his leverage is therefore to increase his perception among other Somalis and the present himself as guardian of the Somali constitution. This line of thought supports and maintains his own power position within Somalia and towards external actors. This situation creates some contradictions for Deni, exemplified by the Israeli recognition of Somalialand in December 2025. While “the widespread public anger in Somalia reflects a rare show of political, […] Puntland and Jubaland […] have remained silent“ (Ali, 2025). This scenario demonstrates the limited political scope Deni possesses towards Abu Dhabi, limiting his ability to act as an opposition figure visa Mogadishu and claimed negative external influence (SomaliGuardian, 2025c). Applying the established notion of the strongman finds that Deni cannot be identified as the pillar of stability and representation of Puntland in the alien- and self-perception. As there are other senior members, and a semi-democratic environment, his position remains fragile and contested in the long-term. Together with the dependency on the UAE, this dynamic is limiting his political agency. However, Puntland’s position in the SFC and ongoing internal troubles can be identified as a window of opportunity for Deni. Therefore, a solution to the constitutional and electoral requires guarantees of political advantages to find Deni’s approval. This could include the recognition of Deni as a representative of the voix populi, and further concessions for Puntland’s status as semi-autonomous state. However, the creation of a strong central government would also require a solution for the dependency on external actors, which is not feasible in the short-term.

Conclusion

While Madobe and Deni are united in their opposition to the FGS, they’re motivation, interests and long-term ambitions remain different and sometimes contradictory. Madobe can be rather characterized as a ‘strongman‘, especially given his personalized style of politics and rhetorics. However, he cannot rely on an institutionalized regime and long-term political alliances. Despite these differences, both actors pose a substantial and impactful obstacle to any attempt of the FGS for further constitutional and electoral amendments. At the same time, the SFC lacks unity and a shared vision to advance a constructive reform itself. This dynamic is exacerbated by external actors, who either support Somali actors for short-term economic and security gains or establish deep dependencies. For European actors, this evolving situation remains significant. It is in the economic and political interest of the EU to avert another state-collapse in Somalia, given the paragon example of crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. However, the EU’s diplomatic influence requires regional parents and collaborations, who have already established connections to Somali actors and can wield influence over them. Different interpretations and the implementation of Somali actors on a larger playing field is creating a fragile and complex environment. As the escalations continue, Somalia’s stability and state-building efforts remain questionable.